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Bail Revisited
Hans Zeisel
The American bail system has been under serious criticism on a variety
of grounds. It has been charged with three specific failures, all of which
discriminate against the indigent defendant who cannot make bail: (1)
that it keeps in jail defendants who would have returned to court if they
had been released, some of whom are not even convicted; (2) that it re-
leases defendants who should not have been released; (3) that the very
fact of pretrial detention increases the likelihood that defendants will be
convicted and, if convicted, will receive a custody sentence.'
A comprehensive study of the law enforcement system of New York
City permitted a review of some of these problems.2 Begun in 1973, this
study has as its data base a probability sample3 of 1,888 felony arrests
whose itinerary through the system was traced to final disposition. For a
subsample of 369 cases, interviews were conducted with the arresting po-
lice officer, the assistant district attorney, the defense counsel, and the
judge about the respective part each played in the process that culminated
Hans Zeisel is a Professor Emeritus of Law and Sociology, Research Associate, Center for Studies
in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago, and Consultant, American Bar Foundation.
1. Critical review of the bail system has a distinguished history, for which the following publica-
tions may stand as representative: Arthur L. Beeley, The Bail System in Chicago (1966; 2d imp.,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); Caleb Foote, A Study of the Administration of Bail in
New York City, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693 (1958); Charles E. Ares, Anne Rankin, & Herbert Sturz,
The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 67
(1963); U.S., Department of Justice, Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administra-
tion of Federal Criminal Justice, Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, report
submitted to Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States, Feb. 25, 1963 (n.p.); Daniel
J. Freed & Patricia M. Wald, Bail in the United States: 1964, report to the National Conference on
Bail and Criminal Justice under cosponsorship of U.S. Department of Justice and the Vera Founda-
tion, Inc. (Washington, D.C., 1964); Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Ball: U, 113
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1125 (1965); A. Rankin, The Effect of Pre-trial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 641
(1964); William M. Landes, The Bail System: An Economic Approach, 2 J. Legal Stud. 79 (1973);
id., Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. Legal Stud. 287 (1974).
2. The substance of the articles on bail appearing in this Journal is part of my forthcoming book,
"The Anatomy of Law Enforcement," to be published by the University of Chicago Press.
3. One drawn by some sort of lottery, which gives each unit in the sampled population an equal
chance of being selected. Findings from such a sample can be projected with computable accuracy to
the population from which it was drawn.
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in the disposition.4 The data permit a close-up view of the bail system as
it operates in the largest metropolitan court system in the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the law vigorously insists on the presumption of innocence,
and although only about one-fourth of all felony arrests end in a custody
sentence of any sort, the law enforcement process begins with the sus-
pected defendant's being taken into custody.5 To be sure, within a rela-
tively short time (within 24 hours in New York), this preliminary custody
must be reviewed by the arraignment judge. But even at that point, long
before any evidence is produced, the majority of the defendants arrested
for a felony are kept in custody, albeit conditionally, until such time as
they can post the bail set by the judge. For the defendants who cannot
make bail, the judge's bail decision may be the most important step in the
entire enforcement process.
Denial of bail is a rare event, although the New York law allows the
judge to hold without bail a defendant who is charged with a felony.6 As
a rule, the judge either sets bail or releases the defendant on his own re-
cognizance (ROR). The law lists the circumstances the court must consider
in making its bail decision: the defendant's (1) character, reputation,
habits, and mental condition; (2) employment and financial resources; (3)
family ties and length of residence in the community; (4) criminal record;
(5) record of previous adjudication as juvenile delinquent or youthful of-
fender; (6) record in responding to court appearances when required or
with respect to flight to avoid criminal prosecution; (7) the weight of evi-
dence against defendant and any other factor indicating the probability
or improbability of conviction, or, on appeal, the merit or lack of merit
of the appeal; and (8) the sentence that may be or has been imposed.7
Figure 1 gives the overall pattern of the bail decisions for defendants
brought into the court on a felony charge. In 34 percent of the cases, the
judge released the defendant on recognizance, that is, without bail; in 3
percent of the cases the defendant was held without bail; in the remaining
63 percent the judge set bail. Of these, in 10 percent the bail was below
$250; in 50 percent bail was set between $250 and $1,000; in the remain-
ing 40 percent bail was set above $1,000.'
4. The study began originally under the auspices of the Vera Institute of Justice, whose research
director I was at the time. It was financed by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Serv-
ices, the state funding branch of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S. De-
partment of Justice.
5. This holds true only for felony arrests; arrests for lesser lawbreaking may be initiated by a sum-
mons.
6. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 530.20 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
7. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
8. The bail information we were able to collect is incomplete since it does not record whether the
amount was cash bond or not. The omission was discovered only after we had received the criminal
history information for the individual cases, which made it impossible to go back to the files since
1979:769
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While the law asks the judge to consider a great many aspects of the
crime and the defendant, in practice he is guided in his bail decision by
the small amount of information available at the time bail is set. Normal-
ly, the bail judge has no more before him than the defendant's criminal
record, if he has one;9 the crime with which he is charged; and whatever
Bail Decision
(Percent)
Released
(Without Bail) on 34
Recognizance (ROR)
Amount of Bail
(Percent)
.......... .... 10 Under $250
50 $250-S1,000
Bail Set 63
r40 Over $1,000
Held Without Bail 3
100% 100%
N = (1,423) (896)
Fig. 1. The bail decision
we had been forced to remove the defendant's identification. The harm is small, because the two
types divide according to the bail amount set. We obtained the corresponding data (shown below)
from the Brooklyn Pretrial Services Agency (see note 10 infra).
Bail and Cash Bond Amounts in Brooklyn Criminal Court in 1972-73
Percent of Cases Percent Unsecured
Amount (N = 1,418) Cash Bonds
$ 1-$ 250 .......... 20 98
251- 500 .......... 28 13
501- 1,000 .......... 17 5
1,001- 2,500 .......... 17 2
2,501- 5,000 .......... 10 1
5,001 or more ........... 8 
All cases ................ 100 25
Bail amounts up to $250 were predominantly cash bonds; all higher bail amounts contained only a
small fraction of cash bond.
9. It goes without saying that both judges and defendants, in the sample as well as in the society
at large, include both women and men. But since this study is not considering the factor of the sex of
the subjects, for economy and ease of reading in this article the generic singular "he," "him," and
"his" will be used to refer to both women and men.
No. 4
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information the assistant district attorney, the defense counsel, and the
defendant himself might bring to the court's attention either on their own
initiative or at the court's request."
Figure 2 shows how the bail decision is influenced by the severity of the
Crime Class Charged
C D
Major
N- (45)
Minor
N= (52)
None
N = (25)
N = (122)
(51) (15)
(107) (53)
(84) (13)
(242) (81)
.The number of total cases exceeds the sum of the group numbers because the information on crime class charged and
criminal record was not always available.
Fig. 2. Bail decision by crime class charged and criminal record: percent for whom bail is set at
$250 or more.
10. This pattern has changed in recent years. The Pretrial Services Agency, pioneered by the Vera
Institute of Justice originally in one of the boroughs, is now operating on a city-wide basis as an in-
dependent organization with the guidance of the deputy mayor for criminal justice. One of the con-
tributions of this innovative agency is to provide the arraignment judge with detailed information
concerning the person of the defendant.
Criminal
Record
A+ B Total*
(159)
I.
.... 64
(577)
1979:769
HeinOnline  -- 1979 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 772 1979
BAIL REVISITED
arrest charge and the seriousness of the defendant's prior record." The
defendants arraigned before the bail judge are grouped in the graph ac-
cording to the crime class charged (across) and their criminal record
(down). The graph indicates for each of the resulting 12 subgroups the
proportion of defendants for whom bail was set at $250 or more; the
complementary percentage (not listed) comprises the defendants for
whom bail was set at less than $250 or who were released without bail.
The 12 bars that form the body of the graph show how the severity of
crime and the defendant's record combine in determining the amount of
bail. Throughout, the difference between defendants with major records
and those with minor records is small, whereas that between those with
any record and those with no record is great. Predictably, the highest
proportion of no or low bail (81 percent) is found in the lower right-hand
bar, the defendants with no record charged with the lowest felony. Since
both the severity of the charged crime and the defendant's criminal rec-
ord are also the prime determinants of the sentence that may eventually
be imposed on the defendant, the bail decision is therefore also related to
the expected sentence.
As figure 3 shows, there is also a relationship between the bail decision
No Bail
(ROR)
Below
$250
$250-
$1,000
Over
$1,000
.. .. .. .......-.
4:::54.X. 6161
...... -. ..- - 2.
:.'..'.:.'.:..'.:.0 ............
34% 6% 32% 25%
Held
Without Bail
%
°;°%%',
3o%O..
Total
-* 100%
(N = 1,337)
Fig. 3. Bail decision and conviction rate (percent)
11. If bail is set below $250, 9 out of 10 defendants are able to make it. And since only 8 percent
of all defendants fall into this minimal bail category, we group them with the defendants who were
released without bail. The number of cases included in this and the following graphs does not always
reach the number of cases in fig. 1, because in some cases the additional information required for
the more detailed statistic was not available.
No. 4
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and the likelihood of eventual conviction, but it is not as strong as one
might expect. The proportion of convicted defendants increases only by
small increments from those released without bail (ROR) to those for
whom high bail was set. Only the 3 percent of the defendants held with-
out bail showed a high conviction rate.
II. MAYING BAIL
Once bail is set, the next move-to make bail if he can-is up to the
defendant. As one would expect and as figure 4 shows, the higher the
bail, the smaller the proportion of defendants who can make it. Figure 5
gives the overall view of the bail status of all defendants. Almost one-half
of the defendants for whom bail was set-29 percent of all defend-
ants-were unable to make it. Together with the 3 percent to whom bail
was denied, these defendants form the group held in jail, altogether
about one-third of all defendants.' 2 The remaining two-thirds of the de-
fendants either made bail or were released on recognizance without bail.
Under
$250 $250-$1,000 Over $1,000 Total
Bail Made 89 61 35 54
Bail V 39
Not Made . 46
10% 50% - 40% ' 100%
(N 840)
Fig. 4. Percent bail made by amount of bail
III. THE Two POTENTIAL ERRORS
Ideally, bail should be high enough to insure the defendant's appear-
ance at trial but not higher. Reaching this ideal would require a degree of
familiarity with the defendant's circumstances and character which far
transcends even the best available pretrial information. As a result, the
system is bound to make errors. In some cases, it will force some defend-
ants unable to make bail to stay in jail, although they would have ap-
12. Some of these defendants (their number has never been determined) make bail at some later
point, prior to the disposition of their case.
1979:769
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peared in court if bail had been set at a level they could have afforded;' 3
the pretrial detention of these defendants represents the system's most
signal failure. In other cases, the system will make the error of releasing
some defendants who then jump bail but conceivably would have ap-
peared in court if higher bail had been set.
Traditionally, the courts have erred more often in the first direction. A
massive reform movement, spearheaded by the Vera Foundation, now
the Vera Institute of Justice, has done much to reduce that error. In 1961
Vera conducted a controlled experiment with important implications for
the direction of reform. Defendants in the New York courts were as-
signed randomly, that is, by lot, to two groups: in a control group the
judge set bail as usual; in an experimental group the judge was provided
Bail Decision
(Percent)
Released
Without Bail
Bail Set
Held Without Bail
N = (1,423)
Fig. 5. Bail status of all defendants
13. The situation is aggravated for the detained defendants who eventually are acquitted or whose
cases are dismissed. This, however, is a different problem, created by the higher standard of proof
required for conviction than for the pretrial stage of prosecution; "probable cause" as against
'proof beyond reasonable doubt." This unresolved problem has engendered the proposal to hold an
evidentiary hearing prior to a defendant's pretrial detention. Jeff Thaler, Punishing the Innocent:
The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 441.
No. 4
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with background information on the defendant and with a recommenda-
tion as to whether or not it was safe to release him without bail. In this
experimental group, many more defendants were released without bail on
their own recognizance; only 40 percent were kept in jail as against 86
percent in the control group where bail was set as usual. Increasing the
release rate did not result in an increase in the number of defendants who
jumped bail; the proportion of bail jumpers did not exceed 1 percent in
either group. Releasing more defendants without requiring bail turned
out to be a cure without undesirable side effects. 14
That pioneering experiment powerfully stimulated the growth of a na-
tionwide reform movement to reduce the number of defendants held un-
necessarily in pretrial detention, a reform achieved primarily through im-
proving the quality and increasing the amount of information about the
defendants arraigned before the bail judge.'"
We might note that knowledge of that first type of error-detaining
defendants who need not be detained-can come only from a controlled
experiment such as Vera conducted. There is no other way of estimating
how many of the defendants who could not make bail would have ap-
peared in court if they had been released. The data from the present
study, while they were not derived from such an experiment, cannot illu-
minate that part of the issue; however, they do measure the second type
of error, the proportion of released defendants who jump bail. 16
Until recently the courts, for understandable reasons, have not been
eager to publish bail-jumping figures. 7 Also, the reform-minded critics
of the bail system have a tendency to minimize the importance of these
figures, perhaps because in the original Vera experiment they formed in-
deed a negligible quantity. Thus we read in one recent major study, "The
number of defendants who . . . are lost to the court system and thereby
evade justice is quite small." For 11 of the 14 recorded cities the propor-
tion of "fugitives" of defendants released after a felony charge was less
than 3 percent. 8
14. Ares, Rankin, & Sturz, supra note 1, at 86.
15. For reasons I have never appreciated, Vera's recommendations have always been based on the
defendant's demographic and background characteristics. The information did not include the seri-
ousness of the offense or the severity of the sentence that was to be expected. It was left to the judge
to base his judgment on the joint weight of all factors. This division makes it impossible to decide
whether the judge followed the recommendation. It also makes it impossible to evaluate the recom-
mendation itself.
16. The expression "jump bail" here includes also defendants released without bail (ROR) who
failed to return to the court.
17. For some time now, however, the Quarterly Reports of the New York City Criminal Justice
Agency have been reporting bail-jumping figures.
18. Wayne H. Thomas, Ball Reform in America 104 table 36 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1976). The above figure is suspect. For the cities of San Diego, Philadelphia, and Hartford,
the cited statistics (these cities provide roughly three-fourths of all cases in the study) claim zero per-
cent fled the jurisdiction of the court. Allowing for the rounding-off effect, this means that less than
of I percent jumped bail. For Kansas City, which released only 37 percent of its felony defend-
1979:769
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Our data suggest, however, that the bail-jumping rates have reached a
level that demands attention. In New York, bail jumping is no longer a
negligible event: among the 65 percent of all defendants "at risk" (those
who made bail or were released without bail) the proportion of bail
jumpers was 9.5 percent, which amounts to (9.5 x 0.65 =) 6.2 percent
of all defendants. To put that figure into perspective: in 1973 more de-
fendants jumped bail (6.2 percent) than were eventually sent to prison for
more than one year (5.4 percent).' 9
Figure 6 shows how little the bail-jumping rate varies with the amount
of bail set and made; through all brackets, it hardly deviates from the 10
percent average. Since bail jumping is clearly an undesirable event, one
No Bail Under $250- Over Total Average All
(ROR) $250 $1,000 $1,000 Average Defendants*
N = (498) (75) (256) (118) (947) (1,423)
*This includes defendants both in and out of jail.
Fig. 6. Percent jumping bail by amount of bail
ants prior to trial, the bail-jumping rate is recorded as 18 percent. Such stark differences suggest er-
ror in the data compilation.
19. Determining the jump rate is a tricky business because nonappearances differ in kind, from
the involuntary missing of a court appearance or two to the deliberate decision not to appear again.
The issuance of a bench warrant seldom distinguishes the temporary from the permanent disappear-
ance. The proper way of making the distinction is to define flight through the lapse of a sufficiently
large time interval, for instance, a six-month period. As defined in this study, bail jumpers include
all who disappeared sufficiently long from the system so that a warrant for their arrest was issued
and had not been returned by the time, at least several months later, when our data were collected
and the cases were recorded as undisposed.
No. A
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would like to see its overall distribution. Figure 7 makes such an effort: it
shows the jump rate for all defendants-whether at risk or not-for the
20 combinations of 4 criminal record and 5 arrest categories.
Only 3 percent of the bail jumpers had a prison record. Two-thirds of
all bail jumpers had no record and were charged with the two lowest felo-
ny grades. From what we know from this study, these defendants had rel-
atively little to fear from the court's disposition.
Criminal
Record Crime Class Charged
A B C D E
Jail or
Prison 4%
Convictions 14%
0%_I
Arrests
4% 78%
None
Total 100%
Fig. 7. Percent distribution of bail jumpers by crime class charged and criminal record
In the two categories that mark the potentially most dangerous offend-
ers, there is hardly any bail jumping. Nobody charged with a class A
crime jumped bail, and the defendants who had a jail or prison record
form all told only 4 percent of all bail jumpers. This comes as a surprise.
One would have expected the jump rate to increase among the defendants
who faced the risk of a severe sentence rather than among these low-level
defendants. The bulk of the bail jumpers clearly are the minor and less
dangerous offenders.
At first blush one might see here the counterpart of the system's earlier
error of releasing too few defendants and argue that it now releases too
many. Our data suggest that this would be a poor answer. Unless one
1979:769
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could pinpoint the future bail jumpers in advance-which one can-
not-the error rate of unnecessary incarcerations would rise substantially
if one were to increase the number of pretrial detentions. For every foiled
bail jumper one would have to keep 10 defendants unnecessarily in jail
because they would have appeared in court anyway. This follows from
the finding that the average bail-jumping rate in all groups at risk is ap-
proximately 9 percent, about 1 out of every 11 cases.20
The data suggest a better remedy. The new bail jumpers, on the whole,
face only minor charges and have either no record or only a minor one;
they have, therefore, relatively little to fear from the law. The worst they
face is a minor jail sentence. Bail jumping, therefore, is a decision to dis-
appear not so much because the consequences of the pending criminal
prosecution are too threatening but rather because the consequences of
disappearing are negligible. The judge will issue a warrant for arrest, but
to search out such defendants and execute the warrant could be time con-
suming, and the police probably assign a low priority to it. As a rule,
these defendants reappear when they are arrested on another charge. A
more thorough follow-up by the police of the court-issued warrants
should bring some of the bail jumpers back.
Increasing the number of pretrial detentions seems to be the wrong so-
lution because it invariably increases the number of unnecessary deten-
tions, including defendants who eventually are not even convicted.
IV. PRETRIAL DETENTION AFFECTS THE DISPOSITION
We now turn to the most serious congenital defect of the system. A
growing body of evidence suggests that some defendants unable to make
bail are, for that reason alone, more likely to be convicted and, if con-
victed, more likely to be sentenced to jail. The discriminatory effect was
observed for the first time serendipitously in the Vera experiment, which
was designed to discover whether more defendants could be released
without bail. The Vera findings were later buttressed by studies that
formed the foundation of two major lawsuits attacking the constitution-
ality of the New York bail laws.2 The data in the present study corrobo-
rate these earlier observations; in addition, they bring us closer to ex-
plaining them.
The first suggestion of the jail effect came from the raw comparison of
the conviction and sentencing rates of defendants on bail and defendants
20. See fig. 7 supra.
21. Bellamy v. Judges & Justices, 41 A.D.2d 196, aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 866, 346 N.Y.S.2d 812, remit-
titur amended, 33 N.Y.2d 632, 347 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1973), and Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 1912 (1976).
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in jail, as shown in figure 8. Many more of the defendants who could not
make bail, and therefore remained in jail, were convicted than of the de-
fendants who made bail. And of the convicted defendants, those in jail
received a custody sentence more often than the defendants who made
bail. Such raw comparison, however, does not prove discrimination be-
cause, in some cases, cause and effect may be reversed; for the defend-
ants more likely to be severely sentenced if convicted, higher bail may
have been set, which fewer of them could make. 22
Percent of
Defendants Convicted
Bail Made In Jail
N = (434)
Percent of
Convicted Defendants
Sentenced to Custody
Bail Made In Jail
(204) (247)
Fig. 8. Bail status, rate (percent) of conviction, and likelihood (percent) of custody sentence
To separate cause from effect in this entangled situation is difficult.
Perfect separation could come only from a controlled experiment in
which for a group of defendants the decision to be released or detained
would be made randomly (by lot) instead of on the basis of the defend-
ant's ability to make bail. Selection by lot would insure that the two
groups would be equal in every respect, except that one half, the experi-
mental group, would be kept in jail, while the other half, the control
group, would be out of jail. If, under these controlled conditions, the de-
tained group would show a higher conviction and custody rate, this dif-
22. The law indeed instructs the judge to do this. See point 8 of the statute on p. 770 and note 7
supra.
1979:769
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ferential could be unambiguously ascribed to the fact of detention, be-
cause being detained or not being detained would be the only difference
between the two groups.
Although such an experiment could not be permitted, at least not in
the radical form outlined above, looking at its structure will aid in the
analysis of the data available on this crucial issue. This analysis, which
must be modeled after that ideal, impossible experiment, can be achieved
by restricting comparison to more narrowly defined subgroups that, ex-
cept for the in-jail-out-of-jail difference, would have a reasonably equal
chance of being convicted and, if convicted, a reasonably equal chance of
receiving a custody sentence.
Of the two propositions-that defendants in pretrial detention have a
higher likelihood of conviction and that they have a higher likelihood of
a custody sentence-the latter is more understandable. The greater likeli-
hood of a detained defendant's ending up with a jail sentence if convicted
is not surprising. If a defendant at the time of sentencing has spent some
time in jail, the court will be tempted to make the time served "legal" by
imposing a jail sentence rather than allowing a "walk" sentence that may
raise doubts about the merits of the earlier imposed pretrial detention.
We begin the analysis with a test of the second proposition. We present
this effort in figure 9 by sorting the convicted defendants first by the seri-
ousness of the crime they had been charged with and then by the serious-
ness of their criminal record. In each of these groups we then compare
the frequency of a custody sentence among the defendants free on bail
and among the defendants in jail. With the exception of the few defend-
ants charged with a class A crime, the analysis reveals that in every class
the defendants who could not make bail were worse off than their coun-
terparts out of jail. The same is true for the four comparisons of defend-
ants with similar criminal records.
We now turn to the analysis of the first, less understandable proposi-
tion that defendants in pretrial detention are, for that reason alone, more
likely to be convicted than if they had been free on bail. Figure 10 shows
the comparison of 16 subgroups, the combinations of 4 crime classes and
4 types of criminal records. Compared with figure 9, this is a more elab-
orate analysis, made possible by the greater sample at our disposal; we
can use all defendants rather than only the convicted ones. In all but 3 of
the 16 cells of figure 10, comparison of defendants with the same record
and charged with the same crime class shows that the defendants in cus-
tody have a higher conviction rate than the defendants who make bail.
The three reversals occur again among defendants charged with the high-
est crime classes (A and B) who have at least a prior arrest record. The re-
versal, in spite of the small sample, makes sense; when the stakes are very
No. 4
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high, being in jail will make little difference for the outcome. There is,
nevertheless, a loophole left in the evidence of figure 10; the judge to
some extent sets higher bail for the defendants against whom the evidence
Crime Class Charged
On Bail In Jail
Jail or
Prison
Convictions
Arrests
None
Criminal Record
On Bail In Jail
Fig. 9. Percent difference of custody sentences after conviction by crime class charged, criminal
record, and bail status.
1979:769
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is strong. 2s If he does that, we must not be surprised that defendants who
stay in jail are more often convicted.
In response to this objection, figure 11 shows in addition to the group-
ing by criminal record the grouping by the dollar range within which bail
was set. Again, in all but two groups the defendants who could not make
bail have higher conviction rates than those who could. The puzzle is why
this should be so. A 1971 study advanced the following hypothesis:
Criminal
Record Crime Class Charged
A& B
On Bail In Jail
C
On Bail In Jail
D
On Bail In Jail
E
On Bail In Jail
None
N = (13) (12) (32) (19) (73) (31) (9) (6)
Fig. 10. Conviction rate (percent) by crime class charged, criminal record, and bail status
23. The relationship, as observed in fig. 3, is not very strong.
Jail or
Prison
Convictions
N=
Arrests
No. A
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One factor which might explain differences in guilty findings is that the
incarcerated defendant cannot consult with his lawyer as freely or as often
as the person not detained. Neither is he free to prepare his case fully, to
gather witnesses, or to establish an alibi ...
* * * Detainees also are less able to afford the service of paid investiga-
tors, or the expense of witnesses. Incarcerated defendants are also more
readily available to law enforcement officials for involuntary participation
in lineups and other police processes that may increase the likelihood of a
Ball Below $250
On Bail In Jail
None
N= (27) (1)
Total
Ball $250-$1,000
On Bail In Jail
(49) (32)(9
Ball Over $1,000
On Bail In Jail
(28) (29)
+5
Fig. 11. Conviction rate (percent) by defendant's bail status, criminal record, and amount of bail
Criminal
Record
Jail or
Prison
Convictions
N -t
Arrests
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finding of guilt. Finally, defendants who come into court in the custody of
police officers, stripped of their self-confidence by detention, and wearing
prison clothes or the clothes in which they were arrested, may be preju-
diced in the eyes of the jury.2 4
The data in the present study suggest a different or at least a supple-
mentary explanation: that the bargaining power of a defendant is reduced
when he is in jail and, conversely, that the bargaining power of the prose-
cutor is reduced when the defendant is free on bail.
The issue comes up as follows. The defendant in jail is told one day by
his lawyer: "The D.A. has agreed to a jail sentence of x weeks (or
months) if you plead guilty," or words to that effect. Often that sentence
will be equal to the time spent in pretrial detention so that the defendant
would be freed immediately upon pleading guilty. Such a sentence is
dubbed "time served." If the offered sentence were to exceed somewhat
the time spent in pretrial detention, the guilty plea would secure at least
an early release. This is an incentive to pleading guilty which the defend-
ant who made bail does not have. As a result, every so often a guilty plea
is given by a defendant in jail who would have refused such a plea had he
not been in jail. In some cases this refusal will eventually be rewarded by
the prosecutor's decision to dismiss the case rather than to try it: "If the
attorney had not pleaded guilty to a B misdemeanor, the case would have
been dismissed; the complaining witness, herself a junkie with a record,
refused to come into court" (assistant district attorney in case 198). And
every so often, the defendant free on bail, before pleading guilty, will be
able to negotiate for a nonprison sentence, where under equal circum-
stances the defendant in custody will accept "time served." 2 The follow-
ing cases illustrate the "time served" offer:
When a transit policeman entered an mIT subway train, he saw two
youths standing at the car door. They were the only passengers in the car.
As he moved in the car, the policeman saw a brown paper bag with a hand-
gun; he said he could see the contents from where he stood. On the oppo-
site seat, under some newspapers, he discovered a pistol. The gun was in
operating condition. The two youths were charged with possession of a
prohibited weapon. Bail was set, which the defendant (in our sample)
24. Arthur R. Angel, Eric D. Green, Henry R. Kaufman, & Eric E. Van Loon, Preventive Deten-
tion: An Empirical Analysis, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 289, 348-49 (1971), reprinted by American
Bar Foundation under Law Review Research Project: Staff of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liber-
ties Law Review, op. cit. (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1971) (footnotes omitted).
25. There is a hint in our data that being in jail may also affect the defendant's decision whether
to go to trial or to plead guilty:
Percent of Defendants Going to Trial
Defendants Percent Approximate N
Free on bail .......... 3.3 (425)
In jail ............... 1.7 (381)
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could not make, the codefendant made bail and was eventually indicted on
a different charge and separated from the case. Eventually, the defendant
pleaded guilty against an offer of "time served." (case 50)
The defendant and three unapprehended accomplices were charged with
robbery at knife point. A knife had been found at the scene of the crime
but it could not be linked up with the defendant. No blood had been found
on the weapon, no property was found on the defendant, who had been
apprehended near the scene of the crime, though the ADA did not know
how close. Defendant and complainant had known one another and prob-
ably had been lovers. The case was a year old when it was evaluated for
disposition. During all that time, the defendant had been in jail. The pros-
ecutor thought the case weak; he interviewed the complainant prior to dis-
position and found that he had changed his testimony. There were also
contradictions between complaint and indictment. On the basis of these
facts, the prosecutor offered a plea to a D felony and a sentence of "time
served" and the defendant accepted. (case 96)
The complainant was the common-law wife of the defendant. There had
been a fight the night before. When the woman complained to the police
and the defendant was questioned, he went back to her and hit her with a
soda-water bottle over the head. He was charged with assault and posses-
sion of a dangerous instrument. He could not make bail. After spending
some time in jail, he pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree, an A mis-
demeanor. He received a five-month sentence because he had a record of
some 20 convictions. Since the complaining witness had withdrawn, there
is a good chance that the case would have been dismissed had the defend-
ant not been in jail. (case 281)
We should expect the effect of being in jail to be particularly large
among defendants in the lower sentence brackets where a jail sentence,
especially a time-served sentence, and a walk sentence are plausible alter-
natives. Looking back at figure 11, we find this to be the case. The dif-
ferences are lowest (even negative) after arrests for the most serious
crimes and the most serious prior record, and they are highest around the
lower right-hand corner where the expected sentence will be modest.
The effect of pretrial detention is minimal where serious crimes are
concerned; the effect is likely to grow where the crime is minor. The dif-
ferential effect is aggravated if the prosecutor is less eager to go to trial.
Since that eagerness is likely to decline with the seriousness of the de-
fense, this is another reason why the effect of pretrial detention on con-
viction rates is likely to be greatest where the crime is least serious. For
these reasons, an analogous study among defendants charged with a mis-
demeanor instead of a felony should reveal an even greater effect of pre-
trial detention on the likelihood of conviction.26
26. Such a study would be of particular interest because, at the present time, the New York prose-
cutors bring hardly any misdemeanor cases to trial. Being in jail on such a charge, therefore, may be
the major incentive to pleading guilty.
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We shall now attempt to measure the magnitude of the discriminatory
effect, that is, the proportion of cases in which a conviction is obtained
because the defendant was in pretrial custody.
At first, the proportion of defendants who received a time-served sen-
tence-it was 6 percent-might look like a good point to start from. That
figure, however, overstates the looked-for effect in one respect and un-
derstates it in another. It overstates it because it is in no way certain that
in these cases the refusal to plead guilty would not have led to a convic-
tion; the prosecutor might have gone to trial and obtained one. The fig-
ure understates the effect because it does not include the defendants free
on bail, against whom the prosecutor dismissed the charges but from
whom he would have obtained a guilty plea had the defendant been in
jail. Thus the time-served figure is not of much help.
Another source for estimating the size of the discriminatory effect is
figure 11. There we compare for 12 subgroups, defined by amount of bail
and the defendant's prior record, the conviction rates of the defendants
on bail and in jail. The weighted average of these differences, weighted
by the respective number of defendants in jail, is 13 percentage points.
This figure will overstate the true effect because the cases represented by
each pair of bars are not perfectly alike as they would be had they been
derived from a controlled experiment, or if at least the ranges of bail
amounts had been narrower. Arbitrarily averaging the two estimates, 6
and 13 percent, yields approximately 10 percent. Assuming that figure to
be correct, the following conclusions would follow: (1) the average con-
viction level among the defendants who could not make bail was 68 per-
cent (fig. 8), but had these defendants been able to make bail, only
(68 - 11 =) 57 percent of them would have been convicted; and (2) such
a reduction of the conviction rate of these defendants in jail would re-
duce the overall conviction rate for all defendants (of whom two-thirds
are not in jail) from 56 percent to 53 percent.
All these computations are but approximations. They are based on
sample data; they are based not on controlled experiments but on efforts
to simulate experimental situations by creating reasonably homogeneous
subgroups; and they assume that prosecution policies would not change if
bail procedures were radically altered. With all these uncertainties, these
computations may be taken as a rough measure of the discriminatory ef-
fect of pretrial detention.
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Judged superficially by its end effect, the bail system seems to work
reasonably well: although two-thirds of all defendants are released either
without or because they make bail, altogether only 6 percent of defend-
ants jump bail, of which 5 percent either have no prior record or face rel-
atively minor charges.
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In a fundamental way, however, we know very little about how well
the system operates-that is, how well it operates in terms of its own spe-
cific goals. That goal is to set bail in each instance at the minimum
amount that, if the defendant posts it, will insure his return to court. In
these terms, from our study we know only that the bail decision was cor-
rect for the (34 x 0.09 =) 31 percent of the defendants released without
bail who justified the confidence and the return to court. What we do not
know is whether the 29 percent of the defendants who could not make
the demanded bail would have returned if bail had been set at an amount
they could have afforded; nor do we know whether it was the posted bail
that led 31 percent of the defendants to make bail and return to
court-that is, we do not know whether they would have returned also
with a lower bail or even without bail.
Among these potential miscalculations, some are clearly of lesser sig-
nificance: if a defendant is able to make bail on his own even if it was set
at an unnecessarily high level, the harm is minor-he will get his money
back; but if he is detained, and eventually not even convicted, the miscal-
culation is more serious.
The one thing we do know with reasonable certainty about our bail
system is that the very fact of pretrial detention adversely affects the de-
fendant's chances of being acquitted and, if convicted, of being sen-
tenced to a noncustody sentence.
It is not immediately clear in which direction one should eliminate the
discriminatory effect: should the conviction rates of the detained defend-
ants be reduced, or should the conviction rates of the defendants on bail
be increased? In any event, the discriminatory effect of pretrial detention
cannot be doubted any longer. How can it be removed?
In theory, speedy disposition of the cases in jail could reduce the dif-
ferential. But these time-served or "near-time-served" cases, which ac-
count for the bulk of that type of discrimination, are found in the lower
ranges of crime, where sentences are measured in weeks or months. And
since "speedy trial" normally means within about three months after ar-
rest, this is not speedy enough; a three-month pretrial detention often
provides a sufficient basis for a time-served sentence.
Since the discrimination arises from a shift in the bargaining power of
the prosecutor, it can be reduced only by reducing that discretionary
power.2
27. The only way, obviously not a feasible one, to eliminate this effect of pretrial detention would
be an early, unchangeable decision by the district attorney whether or not to prosecute and to go to
trial if the defendant does not plead guilty to the charge.
The problem cannot easily arise under continental European law because there the guilty plea is
unknown; no conviction can be obtained without trial.
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Our bail system suffers from fundamental difficulties. It is predicated
on the legal fiction that its sole purpose is to insure the defendant's ap-
pearance on his appointed day in court. In fact, another purpose often
has greater weight with the judges. Because the judge is likely to be
blamed if a defendant whose release he made possible commits another
crime, he often sets bail at an amount he is sure the defendant cannot
make. In other cases, the judge will set bail at a nominal amount, expect-
ing, perhaps even hoping, that the defendant will make bail. In still other
cases, he may set bail at a routine amount and does not know, and possi-
bly does not even care, whether the defendant will make bail. We should
explore the bail judge's thoughts, if any, about whether the defendant
will make bail; about the likelihood that the defendant, if released, will
continue his criminal activities; and about the likelihood of his reappear-
ance in court.
European countries, including England, handle pretrial detention more
directly. They allow it if the court believes one of three dangers likely:
flight, continuation of the criminal activity, and-a ground hardly
known to American law-collusion and tampering with the evidence.
Under most continental laws release on bond is permissible only if the
danger of flight is the sole ground for detention.
Since the realities of our pretrial detention are not so different, we
might consider rethinking, within the constitutional restraints, not only
the modalities of our present bail system but also that institution itself.
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